Rohan points 24 exfiltration payloads at a sandbox whose allowlist holds one entry, then checks his receiver logs rather than the exit code. Nothing arrived. Sixteen attempts died at name resolution, because a non-empty allow_out makes DNS deny-by-default too, which is also why the DNS-over-HTTPS payload failed: to reach the resolver you must first resolve the resolver. He is careful about the three rows that are not policy wins, including two that failed on a missing dependency rather than on the network. The part we would underline is the five payloads that returned exit 0 and delivered nothing. Each one connects straight to a raw IP and gets a handshake from the local egress proxy, then dies the moment the TLS SNI declares a host that is not on the list. Inside the box, a successful connect proves nothing.
We didn’t write this one — it’s Rohan Mistry’s piece, published on Towards AI. The note above is ours; the full article is theirs.